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Many  non-economists  expect  the  costs  associated  with  globalization  to  exceed  its 
benefits. Fears of an erosion of social and environmental standards, high poverty rates in less 
developed countries and ever higher frequencies of financial crisis resulted in protests like 
that in Seattle in 1999. Quite the contrary, most economists strongly believe the net effect of 
globalization  to  be  positive.  Apart  from  economic  theory,  this  optimism  is  supported  by 
empirical studies as well. To measure globalization, most of these studies employed proxies 
like trade and capital flows or openness to these flows. Using these proxies, Beer and Boswell 
(2001) examined the consequences of globalization on inequality. Li and Reuveny (2003) 
analyzed their effects on democracy. As Heinemann (2000) shows, more globalized countries 
have lower increases in government outlays and taxes. Vaubel (1999) found them to have 
lower government consumption. 
The effects of globalization on growth have also been frequently analyzed with these 
measures.  Until  most  recently,  however,  most  studies  examined  them  employing  cross 
sections only. For example, Chanda (2001) uses an index of capital account openness to show 
that  more  developing  countries  have  suffered  from  globalization  than  not,  while  Rodrik 
(1998)  as  well  as  Alesina  et  al.  (1994)  found  no  effect  of  capital  account  openness  on 
economic  growth.
1  With  respect  to  foreign  direct  investment  (fdi)  there  is  evidence  of  a 
positive growth-effect in countries which are sufficiently rich (Blomström et al. 1992) and a 
negative one in low income countries (Garrett 2001).
2 Among others, Dollar (1992) analyzed 
the relationship between economic performance and openness to trade, Frankel and Romer 
(1996) those between growth and actual flows. Their results show that both openness to trade 
and actual trade flows are robustly related to growth. All of these studies present, however, 
only cross sectional estimates. Moreover, they do not adequately control for endogeneity. 
Their results might therefore reflect unobserved characteristics which do not vary over time 
instead of being the consequences of globalization or might reflect reverse causality.
3 
Aware of the shortcomings of the cross-section approach, some recent studies use 
panel data to examine the relationship between some dimensions of globalization and growth. 
Among them, Dollar and Kraay (2001) found that an increase in trade flows and foreign direct 
investment  resulted  in  higher  growth  rates.  Greenaway  et  al.  (1999)  also  report  a  strong 
relationship between trade and growth. With respect to fdi, Borensztein et al. (1998) provide 
                                                           
1 Edison et al. (2002) summarize the literature on capital account liberalization and economic performance. 
2 Studies examining the effects of foreign direct investment on countries’ growth rates have been summarized by 
Durham (2000).   2
 
evidence of a positive growth-effect – given a minimum threshold stock of human capital. 
Carkovic and Levine (2002), to the contrary, do not find a robust influence of foreign direct 
investment on growth. A detailed analysis of the impact of several indicators of financial 
integration and growth is provided by Edison et al. (2002a). Their results show that no robust 
relationship exists. 
While those studies provide very detailed analysis of individual sub-dimensions of 
globalization, none of them examines the consequences of globalization on economic growth 
in greater detail.
4 The effects reported might therefore appear only because other important 
aspects of globalization are omitted from the regressions. Most dimensions of globalization 
are  strongly  related  to  each  other,  so  including  them  separately  in  a  regression  induces 
collinearity problems. Excluding those dimensions which are not the primary focus of the 
analysis – the method preferred in the literature – can, however, severely bias the coefficients 
estimated. Moreover, it is not obvious that all dimensions of globalization affect economic 
performance in the same direction. Since the overall effects of globalization are what matters, 
the lack of an overall measure and an analysis of its relationship with growth is a serious 
omission. The only study trying to measure overall globalization is A.T. Kearney/Foreign 
Policy Magazine (2002). They calculated a globalization ranking using various subgroups. 
Their ranking is, however, only available for three years. Moreover, important dimensions of 
globalization  are  omitted.  The  measure  can  therefore  not  be  used  in  an  empirical 
investigation. 
This paper does not try to give specific policy advice. It tries to contribute to the 
literature in examining the overall effects of several dimensions of globalization on growth 
empirically in a time-series cross-section context. Since many of these dimensions are highly 
correlated, it is impossible to include them all individually in one regression. Therefore, the 
paper  develops  an  index  of  globalization  covering  its  most  important  aspects:  economic 
integration,  social  integration  and  political  integration.  To  measure  these  dimensions,  23 
variables have been combined to three sub-indexes using an objective statistical method. The 
sub-indexes are in turn aggregated into one single index of globalization. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, I present the methodology 
and rationale of the index and present some results. I proceed by analyzing empirically the 
relationship between this index and economic growth. The final section draws conclusions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 Dollar and Kraay (2001: 13) summarize criticisms of this approach. 
4 For a detailed analysis of the several dimensions of globalization on economic policies in the OECD countries 
see Dreher (2005).   3
 
2. Methodology and Rationale of the Index 
 
Throughout  the  paper  globalization  is  meant  to  describe  the  process  of  creating 
networks  of  connections  among  actors  at  multicontinental  distances,  mediated  through  a 
variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital, and goods (Clark 2000: 86). 
It  is  a  process  that  erodes  national  boundaries,  integrates  national  economies,  cultures, 
technologies  and  governance,  and  produces  complex  relations  of  mutual  interdependence 
(Norris  2000:  155).  Among  others  Keohane  and  Nye  (2000:  4)  highlight  the  following 
dimensions of globalization: 
-  economic globalization, characterized as long distance flows of goods, capital and 
services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges, 
-  political globalization, characterized by a diffusion of government policies and 
-  social globalization, expressed as the spread of ideas, information, images, and 
people. 
To measure the degree of economic globalization, two indexes are constructed. One index 
measures actual flows: trade, foreign direct investment and portfolio investment (all in percent 
of GDP). Income payments to foreign nationals and capital employed (in percent of GDP) are 
included to proxy for the extent a country employs foreign people and capital in its production 
processes. The second index measures restrictions on trade and capital using hidden import 
barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade (as a share of current revenue) and an 
index of capital controls. Given a certain level of trade, a country with higher revenues from 
trade  taxes  is  less  globalized.  To  proxy  restrictions  of  the  capital  account  most  previous 
studies employed rather  crude measures.
5 Rodrik (1998) used the proportion of years for 
which the capital account was free of restrictions. Alesina et al. (1994) coded a 0-1 dummy 
variable. Since openness is not a yes-or-no question – it can and does occur in differing 
degrees in different countries – I employ an index constructed by Gwartney and Lawson 
(2002). It is based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions and includes 13 different types of capital controls. The index is constructed by 
subtracting the number of restriction from 13 and multiplying the result by 10. 
The data on actual flows and on restrictions are aggregated into two sub-indexes and 
one overall index as described below. All variables, their precise definitions and data sources 
are listed in the appendix.  
                                                           
5 An exception is Garrett (2001) who employs a ten scale indicator constructed by Brune (2000). He does, 
however, only report cross-section results.   4
 
To proxy the degree of political globalization, the number of embassies in a country, 
the number of international organizations to which the country is a member and the number of 
UN peace missions a country participated in are used.
6  
The  aspects  of  globalization  that  are  hardest  to  pin  down  relate  to  the  flow  of 
information and ideas. According to Keohane and Nye (2000: 4), these constitute, however, 
the most pervasive form of globalism. Therefore, they necessarily have to be included in an 
index of globalization. I measure these flows distinguishing between three categories: data on 
personal contacts, data on information flows and data on cultural proximity. To proxy flows 
of information and personal contacts I use measures like international tourism, internet users, 
and number of radios, among others. The variables are shown in Table 1. Like Saich (2000: 
209), I interpret cultural globalization as the domination of American cultural products. This 
is because the United States is the pacesetter in much of the global social-cultural realm 
(Rosendorf 2000: 111). Cultural proximity could be proxied by the number of English songs 
in  national  hit  lists  or  movies  shown  in  national  cinemas  that  originated  in  Hollywood. 
However, the only proxy available is the number of McDonald’s restaurants located in a 
country. 
To construct the proxies for the empirical analysis, each variable is transformed to an 
index with a zero to ten scale, whereas higher values denote more globalization. When higher 
values of the original variable indicate higher globalization, the formula ((Vi-Vmin)/(Vmax-
Vmin)*10) has been used for transformation. Conversely, when higher values indicate less 
globalization, the formula is ((Vmax-Vi)/(Vmax-Vmin)*10). This is the procedure employed by 
Gwartney  and  Lawson  (2001)  in  the  construction  of  their  economic  freedom  index.  The 
weights for the sub-indexes are calculated using principal components analysis.
7 The year 
2000  is  used  as  the  base  year.  For  this  year,  the  analysis  partitions  the  variance  of  the 
variables used. The weights are then determined in a way that maximizes the variation of the 
resulting principal component. Therefore, the index captures the variation as fully as possible. 
As Gwartney and Lawson (2001: 7) point out, this procedure is particularly appropriate when 
several sub-components measure different aspects of a principal component. I applied the 
same procedure to the overall index.  
If possible, the weights determined for the base year are then used to calculate the 
indexes  for  each  single  year  back to  1970.  Where  no data  are  available,  the  weights  are 
readjusted to correct for this. Since the aim of the paper is to examine longer run changes, the 
                                                           
6  Those  variables  have  been  proposed  by  A.T.Kearney/Foreign  Policy  Magazine  (2000)  to  proxy  political 
engagement.   5
 
yearly indexes are averaged over five years.
8 This is consistent with the analysis of Barro 
(1997). 
The weights for the sub-indexes are presented in Table 1. Table 2 shows the results for 
the 2000 indexes as well as the overall indexes for 1975 and 1990.
9 They are ranked by the 
overall index in 2000. According to this index, the world’s most globalized country is the 
USA with a score of 6.48. This result is driven by high social and political integration with 
the rest of the world. To the contrary, the USA are ranked only 25
th with respect to economic 
integration. According to the index, France has the highest political integration with the rest 
of the world, followed by the USA, Sweden and Canada. Other countries ranking high on the 
overall  index  include  countries  like  Sweden  and  Luxembourg.  While  Hong  Kong  and 
Singapore are ranked second and third, respectively, in terms of actual economic flows (not 
reported in the Table), overall, they are ranked much lower. This is mainly due to their low 
political integration with the rest of the world. According to the political integration index, 
Hong Kong is the country with the lowest score. Since Hong Kong now belongs to China, this 
is obvious. The Table also shows, that overall the world’s least globalized country is Rwanda, 
with an index of 0.92. This country has been destroyed by civil war and bad institutions. Its 
GDP per capita growth rate has been highly volatile over the last years, ranging between 
minus 4 percent in 1997 and plus 3 percent in 2000. It is politically isolated with only 16 in-
country-embassies  in  2000  and  membership  in  32  international  inter-governmental 
organizations. Its sum of exports and imports amounts to 32 percent of its GDP, foreign direct 
investment  inflows  have  been  less  than  1  percent  of  GDP  in  the  same  year.  Capital 
transactions are controlled heavily (IMF 1998). 
The country least integrated in economic terms is Togo, with fdi inflows amounting to 
4 percent of GDP in 1999 and a heavily restricted capital account. Nepal has the lowest social 
globalization score. It had 21 in-country embassies in 2000 and was member in 30 inter-
governmental organizations. Per 1000 capita, 12 daily newspapers have been published and, 
on average, each citizen talked 1.1 minutes with people in another country in 2000 per phone. 
The  next  section  analyzes  the  influence  of  these  dimensions  of  globalization  on 
economic growth. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 A similar methodology has been suggested by Lockwood (2004), testing for the robustness of the Kearny/ 
Foreign Policy Index of globalization.  
8 In some cases, data are only available in five year intervals. In these cases, data refer to the end of the five year 
period. 
9 Due to space restraints, the other results are not reproduced in the Table. They are available from the author.   6
 
3. Empirical Estimates 
 
Table 3 gives first evidence on the relationship between growth and globalization. The 
countries are separated into two sub-samples according to their overall index score. The mean 
of 2.45 of the index is used to draw the line between more and less globalized countries. As 
can be seen, more globalized countries grew faster in every five-year-period. A t-test shows 
that the hypothesis of equal means can be rejected between 1986-1990 and 1996-2000. To 
analyze this relationship in greater  detail,  pooled  time-series  cross-section regressions are 
conducted.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  growth  rate  of  per  capita  GDP.  The  data  are 
averages over five years and cover the time period 1970-2000. They extend to 123 countries. 
Since  some  of  the  data  are  not  available  for  all  countries  or  years,  the  panel  data  are 
unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. 
To  account  for  time-invariant  unobservable  heterogeneity  potentially  correlated  with  the 
regressors, I use a fixed effects specification. A dummy for each of the five-year-periods is 
also  included.  All  standard  errors  are  estimated  robustly.  All  variables,  their  precise 
definitions and data sources are listed in the appendix. 
The  first  column  of  Table  4  includes  variables  typically  employed  in  growth 
regressions (e.g. Barro 1997). The initial level of GDP per capita at each of the five-year 
periods is included to measure the conditional rate of convergence to the steady state growth 
rate. Secondary school enrolment and the log of life expectancy are employed as indicators of 
human  capital.  Since  higher  population  growth  should  directly  lead  to  lower  per  capita 
economic growth, the log of the fertility rate is also included. Higher domestic investment as a 
share of GDP should lead to higher growth rates whereas the effect of higher government 
consumption is not obvious a priori. On the one hand, a large government sector may induce 
inefficiencies and crowd out the private sector. On the other, the provision of an efficient 
infrastructure and a proper legal framework may promote growth (Hansson 2000). To account 
for the quality of the legal system and the enforceability of property rights, a rule of law index 
constructed by Gwartney and Lawson (2002) is included in the regression. Obviously, better 
institutions should promote growth. Finally, I include the change in a country’s terms of trade 
and its rate of inflation. Both have been shown to have a significant effect on growth in 
previous studies. 
Most results do qualitatively correspond to those of Barro (1997). Higher initial GDP 
is significantly associated with lower growth rates. Higher government consumption over 
GDP also leads to lower growth. The same is true for low investment and high inflation.   7
 
Growth rates are higher with better institutions and higher school enrollment. Whereas the 
coefficients of those variables are significant at the five percent level at least, the coefficient 
of a change in a country’s terms of trade is only marginally significant, with a positive sign. 
Life expectancy and fertility rates do not significantly influence economic growth. 
Column 2 includes the overall index of globalization. As can be seen, its coefficient is 
positive and significant at the one percent level. The coefficient of the index shows that a one 
point increase would expand GDP per capita growth by 1.09 percentage points. For example, 
if Latvia was as integrated with the world as Spain, all else equal it could raise its growth rate 
from currently 5.94 to 7.1 percent. This could be achieved by increasing inflows of foreign 
direct investment from 7 to 27 percent of GDP, exports plus imports (in percent of GDP) from 
107 to 140 percent and portfolio investment (in percent of GDP) from 5 to 30 percent. The 
same difference is between Italy and the United Kingdom while increasing the globalization 
index of Zimbabwe to those of the USA would increase the Zimbabwean growth rate by 4.64 
percentage points. The rule of law index is only significant at the ten percent level while 
changes in the terms of trade are now completely insignificant. The regression includes 106 
countries with an average of 4.1 observations. It explains 44 percent of the within-groups 
variation. 
King and Levine (1993) argue that the quality of a country’s financial markets can 
influence economic growth. In column 3, variables to account for this quality are included. 
Liquid liabilities are a typical measure of the financial depth and thus of the overall size of the 
financial sector, stock market capitalization (relative to GDP) is an indicator of the size of the 
stock  market.  However,  confirming  the  results  of  Chanda  (2001),  these  variables  are 
completely  insignificant.  Due  to  missing  data,  the  number  of  observations  is  reduced 
dramatically. This results in generally lower t-statistics. School enrollment and the rule of law 
no longer influence growth significantly. The globalization index, however, is significant at 
the five percent level. 
In recent years, political and institutional variables have been found to have an impact 
on growth.
10 Sala-i-Martin (1997) reports a positive influence of civil liberties and political 
rights on growth. Another variable frequently included in growth regressions is an index of 
democracy (e.g. Fernandez, Ley and Steel 2001, Sala-i-Martin 1997). Column 4 tests for these 
impacts. It includes the political rights and civil liberties index constructed by Gastil (2002) 
and the Polity-IV-indicator of democracy. However, none of these variables has a significant 
influence on economic growth. Again, the globalization index keeps its significance. 
                                                           
10 Carmignani (2001) provides an overview.   8
 
With some of the variables there is an obvious endogeneity problem: previous research 
has shown, that, e.g., fertility is influenced by measures of wealth (Barro and Lee 1994). If 
fertility declines with growth, it is endogenous. The same is true for government consumption 
and investment. Endogeneity might even be a problem for the index of globalization. In the 
framework of the Arellano-Bond estimation discussed below, the right-hand side variables 
can  be  instrumented  and  the  validity  of  the  exogeneity  assumption  can  be  tested.
11  The 
Arellano-Bond estimator consists in first-differencing the estimating equation and using lags 
of the dependent variable from at least two periods earlier as well as lags of the right-hand 
side variables as instruments. Since there are more instruments than right-hand side variables, 
the equations are over-identified and instruments must be weighted in an appropriate way. 
I now regress the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at the end of a five-year period 
on its lag and other variables, as opposed to regressing the growth rate on these variables. 
However, the formulation of the model in differences means that the regression shows how 
changes in globalization affect growth. 
Column 5 presents results from the Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimator, which 
uses the identity matrix as a weighting matrix.
12 Applying this estimator leads to a dramatic 
loss of observations, since information from two periods is discarded by differencing and 
instrumenting. In some cases, this results in lower t-statistics. With one exception, the results 
are nevertheless similar to those obtained with OLS: GDP per capita at the beginning of the 
period is now significantly positive. This confirms the results of Dollar and Kraay (2001). The 
index  of  globalization  is  significant  at  the  five  percent  level,  again  with  a  positive  sign. 
Compared to the previous results, the magnitude of the coefficient is similar. The estimate 
shows that a one point increase in the index of globalization increases GDP growth by seven 
percentage points. The average yearly growth rate thus equals about 1.4 percentage points, 
slightly higher than the previous result of 1.09. 
On  the  basis  of  the  Arellano-Bond  estimator,  a  Sargan  test  on  the  validity  of  the 
instruments can be conducted. This amounts to a test for the exogeneity of the covariates. As 
can be seen from column 3, the Sargan test accepts the over-identifying restrictions. Hence, 
strict  exogeneity  is  not  rejected.  The  Arellano-Bond  test  of  second  order  autocorrelation, 
which must not be present in the data in order for the estimator to be consistent, also accepts 
the specification.  
                                                           
11 Moreover, the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) is consistent, whereas the within groups estimator 
is inconsistent in the presence of a lagged dependent variable in a short panel (Nickell 1981). 
12 The two-step GMM estimator weighs the instruments asymptotically efficiently using the GMM1 estimates. 
However,  in  small  samples  like  this,  standard  errors  tend  to  be  under-estimated  by  the  two-step  estimator 
(Arellano and Bond 1991: 291).   9
 
While the overall effect of globalization on growth was found to be positive, it is 
interesting to examine the effects of the single components. It is not obvious that economic, 
cultural and political dimensions of globalization will necessarily go along with or reinforce 
each other (Brown et al. 2000: 280). As column 6 shows, only economic integration seems to 
be correlated with growth rates. Neither social nor political integration seem to have any 
influence on economic growth. One potential problem with this specification results from the 
high correlation between the three sub-indexes.
13 This probably results in lower t-statistics. 
Therefore, the three dimensions of globalization are analyzed individually as well. In an effort 
to provide more detailed information, I replicate the analysis with the sub-indexes instead of 
the overall index of globalization. Table 5 starts with economic integration. There are various 
reasons why economic integration should promote growth. Trade makes it possible to exploit 
comparative advantages. Countries gain from specialization. Foreign investment might serve 
to close “idea gaps” between developing and developed countries (Romer 1993). It often 
comes along with management educated in industrial countries. This management may try to 
press  for  reforms,  in  order  to  improve  the  business  environment  and  enhance  profits 
(Boockmann and Dreher 2003). Since there might be spillover effects, foreign investment 
could increase the productivity of the whole economy (Rappaport 2000). Workers from other 
countries probably produce similar effects. Openness to international trade should promote 
growth since it encourages gains from trade and fosters innovation and efficient production. 
The effects of capital controls on growth are less obvious a priori. With open capital accounts, 
countries in need of capital can borrow abroad to finance investment, which promotes growth 
(Obstfeld 1998: 2). Moreover, government interventions probably result in inefficiencies and 
underinvestment. They could also promote corruption.
14 On the other hand, however, such 
controls  can  ensure  that  domestic  savings  are  channelled  towards  domestic  investment 
(Chanda 2001: 5). In some cases, capital controls increase the flexibility of monetary and 
fiscal policy. This could increase domestic growth rates. 
Column  1  shows  the  results  for  the  economic  integration  subindex  (estimated  by 
OLS). As can be seen, higher economic integration is significantly associated with higher 
growth. However, while actual flows promote growth rates (column 2), restrictions on trade 
and capital do not have any influence (column 3). 
The insignificant coefficient of restrictions could reflect an average of the benefits 
from liberalization in countries with highly developed financial markets and institutions and 
                                                           
13  The  correlation  between  economic  integration  and  social  globalization  is  0.51,  those  between  economic 
integration and political engagement 0.11 and those between social globalization and political engagement 0.47.   10
 
the costs associated with a higher frequency of financial crisis in less developed countries. 
According to the World Bank (2002: 10), integration with global capital markets can lead to 
disastrous  results  without  sound  domestic  financial  systems.  Garrett  (2001)  suggests  that 
capital  account  openness  promotes  growth  only  in  more  developed  countries.  I  therefore 
employ  interactions  of  the  restrictions-subindex  with  dummies  for  low,  middle  and  high 
levels of GDP and the log of these countries’ per capita GDP at the beginning of a five-year 
period.  The  results  are  reported  in  column  4.  It  turns  out  that  freedom  from  restrictions 
significantly  promotes  growth  only  in  high  income  countries.  In  low  and  middle  income 
countries, the coefficients of the interactions are insignificant.
15 The insignificant coefficient 
does, however, not necessarily mean that liberalization does have no influence on growth in 
these countries. Even in the absence of a direct effect, lower tariffs probably lead to more 
trade, and liberalization of the capital account promotes foreign investment. Therefore, the 
absence of restrictions could increase growth rates nevertheless. 
Columns 5 to 7 report results estimated with the Arellano-Bond estimator. Confirming 
the OLS results, the overall sub-index, the index of actual flows and the interaction of high 
income and restrictions significantly influence growth. However, the Sargan test rejects the 
instruments  when  the  interactions  are  included.  I  therefore  treat  them  as  predetermined. 
Column 7b shows the results. The coefficient of the high income and restrictions interaction 
term is highly significant. Both the Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond test of second-order 
autocorrelation now clearly accept the specification. 
Table 6 reports the results for the political dimension. This aspect of globalization has 
never been studied in the context of growth. However, political integration might influence 
growth rates. Economic globalization leads to the inability of national governments to control 
their  citizens  (Allison  2000:  83).  On  the  one  hand,  high  political  integration  could  serve 
governments as counterweight to globalized markets. They could cooperate to promote more 
redistribution  than  would  otherwise  be  possible.  This  would  probably  reduce  economic 
growth. A good example is pre-industrial-revolution-Europe. Low political integration and 
resulting  competition  between  governments  strongly  promoted  economic  and  technical 
innovations (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986: 137, Jones 1981: 138). On the other hand, high 
integration could lead to reforms in political or economic processes and thus promote growth. 
Examples  could  be  monopoly  regulation  in  the  European  Union  or  free  trade  zones  like 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
14 It has been shown by Dreher and Siemers (2003) that capital account restrictions and corruption re-enforce 
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15 To analyze this relationship in more detail, I also interacted the index with the measures of financial markets’ 
quality introduced above and with the rule of law index. All resulting coefficients are, however, completely 
insignificant. This is consistent with Rodrik (1998).   11
 
NAFTA  and  MERCOSUR.  As  columns  1  and  2  show,  however,  political  integration  is 
completely irrelevant for economic growth. 
Finally,  Table  7  reports  results  for  social  integration.  As  Boockmann  and  Dreher 
(2003) point out, means of information and communication may prove important since they 
relay information about economic success in other countries. Exposure to such information 
may provoke discussions which result in the acceptance of new concepts (Brown et al. 2000: 
279).  Successful  technologies  are  then  adopted  which  promotes  growth.  As  Mayer-
Schöenberger  and  Hurley  (2000:  147)  put  it,  global  communication  networks  promote 
international trade and economic integration, as they lower cross-border transaction costs. 
Marketing  information  can  thus  be  accessed  by  customers  worldwide  which  implicates  a 
decline in the importance of geographic proximity. Given a certain level of information about 
economic policies in other countries, cultural proximity could reduce resistance against those 
ideas. For example, structural reforms conducted by many industrial countries in the eighties 
spread  only  slowly  to  developing  nations.  Only  with  increased  proximity,  developing 
countries reformed their economies as well. It could also be, that simply adopting Western 
technology would not lead to higher growth rates without adopting the social and cultural 
environment in which it is embedded (Saich 2000: 211). 
Since data on cultural proximity are available for only two periods, the Table includes 
only results on personal contact and information flows as well as the overall sub-index. As 
can  be  seen  in  column  1,  social  integration  significantly  promotes  growth.  The  index  of 
personal contact is only marginally significant, information flows are significant at the one 
percent level (columns 2 and 3, respectively).  
When estimated with GMM (and thus in differences), all three indexes do not seem to 
influence  growth  (columns  4  to  6).  The  former results may thus emerge due to reversed 
causality. I therefore tried to estimate all regressions with the globalization variables lagged 
one five-year-period (not reported in the Table). It turns out that only information flows have 
a significant influence on economic growth. This result is confirmed, when I treat information 
flows  as  predetermined  in  the  GMM  regression  (column  6b).
16  Only  this  specification  is 
accepted by the Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond test, while the overidentifying restrictions 
are rejected when the index is treated as exogenous.  
Summing up, in addition to the overall index of globalization, several dimensions have 
a  significant  (positive)  influence  on  growth:  actual  economic  flows,  capital  and  trade 
                                                           
16 When treated as predetermined, the overall social integration index is also significant at the one percent level.   12
 
restrictions  in  developed  countries,  and  flows  of  information.  The  following  paragraph 
examines the robustness of these findings. 
 
4. Robustness Analysis 
 
I test for the robustness of the overall index, actual economic flows, capital and trade 
restrictions in developed countries, and flows of information. First, I check for the influence 
of outliers using an algorithm that is robust to them. The algorithm minimizes the median 
(rather than the mean) of the residuals.
17 Second, I replicate all regressions (estimated with 
OLS and GMM) omitting the following sub-groups: East Asian countries, Latin American 
countries,  Sub-Saharan-African  countries,  OECD  countries  and,  finally,  India  and  China. 
Third, I include further variables which could influence the relationship between the indexes 
and  growth:  black  market  premium,  overall  budget  balance,  political  instability,  the  theil 
index of inequality
18 as well as the variables of banking quality and institutional variables 
introduced above. 
As an obvious shortcoming of the procedure used to derive the globalization indexes, 
changes in the index over time might to some extent reflect missing data instead of real 
changes in globalization. To examine this shortcoming, fourth, an alternative procedure has 
been used as well: In those years where no data for some categories exist, the latest data 
available have been employed for constructing the indexes. Changes in the index over time 
therefore only reflect changes in the underlying data. 
To  measure  political  instability,  I  construct  an  index  employing  the  following 
variables: assassinations, strikes, guerrilla warfare, crisis, riots and revolutions. Since those 
variables  are  highly  collinear,  they  can  not  all  be  included  separately  in  one  regression. 
Therefore an overall indicator is constructed, again using principal components analysis.
19  
Table 8 shows the results of the stability analysis. It turns out that the overall index of 
globalization  is  not  completely  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  further  variables  in  the  GMM 
regressions. In most cases, however, the coefficients do not become insignificant because of 
the  inclusion  of  the  variables  but  to  the  drastically  reduced  number  of  observations.  For 
example, including the variables of banking quality, reduces the number of observations to 
183 (when estimated with GMM). The coefficients remain insignificant when the sample is 
                                                           
17 Least absolute value =min   
b median y xb
i i i | |   . 
18 I also tried the gini coefficient but this leaves us with too few observations for a meaningful regression. 
19 The weights obtained are 0.08 (assassination), 0.1 (strikes), 0.25 (guerrilla warfare), 0.15 (crisis), 0.16 (riots) 
and 0.27 (revolutions).   13
 
restricted to those countries where the additional variables are available even if the variables 
are not included in the regression. 
Actual  economic  flows  are  highly  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  further  variables,  the 
exclusion  of  countries,  the  estimation  method,  and  the  construction  of  the  index.  Its 
coefficient is significant at least at the ten percent level in all regressions. The influence of 
restrictions in developed countries is similarly robust. Only the reduction in the number of 
observations when the banking quality variables are included destroys its significant influence 
on growth. If the banking quality variables are included, only 194 observations remain. I do 
not exclude OECD countries since this would leave us with an insufficient number of high 
income countries. 
As can be seen in the table, information flows are less robustly related to economic 
growth.  They  loose  their  significance,  when  any  of  the  additional  variables  except  those 
accounting for institutional quality are included. Excluding OECD countries also destroys the 
coefficients’  significance.  Like  the  other  indexes  its  is,  however,  highly  robust  to  the 




It  has  been  shown,  that,  contrary  to  the  beliefs  of  its  critics,  globalization  indeed 
promotes  growth.  The  overall  index  of  globalization  is  highly  significant  in  most 
specifications and has been shown to be quite robust to the inclusion of potentially relevant 
covariates  in  the  regression  as  well  as  different  estimation  methods.  These  effects  are 
economically  relevant.  As  an  example,  it  has  been  shown  that  Latvia  could  increase  its 
economic growth rate from 5.94 to 7.1 if it would be as integrated with the rest of the world 
as  Spain  is.  This  example  shows  the  limitations  of  the  globalization  process  in  reducing 
poverty as well. For Latvia to become as globalized as Spain would require enormous efforts. 
Such effort is nearly impossible to achieve in the short run but will take many years. As 
another example, the country with the biggest (positive) change in globalization from 1975 to 
2000 has been China. Its index increased by 2.14 points. According to the regression results 
from Table 4 this would mean that China’s growth rate in 2000 is 2.33 percentage points 
higher as in 1975 due to increased integration with the rest of the world. 
In summary, globalization is good for growth. On average, countries that globalized 
more, experienced higher growth rates. This is especially true for actual economic integration 
and  –  in  developed  countries  –  the  absence  of  restrictions  on  trade  and  capital.  There  is   14
 
although evidence, that cross border information flows promote growth. The accusation that 
poverty  prevails  because  of  globalization  is  therefore  not  valid.  To  the  contrary,  those 
countries with the lowest growth rates are those who did not globalize. Countries like Rwanda 
or Zimbabwe, e.g., insulated themselves from the world economy. They have poor institutions 
which repress growth and promote poverty. Nevertheless, all else equal it will not be enough 
for  poor  countries  simply  to  globalize  their  economies  to  spur  growth  rates  and  reduce 
poverty. 
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Table 1: Components of Index of Globalization 
A.  Data on Economic Integration  [35%] 
  i) Actual Flows  (50%) 
       Trade (in percent of GDP)*  (23%) 
       Foreign Direct Investment (in percent of GDP)*  (29%) 
       Portfolio Investment (in percent of GDP)*  (27%) 
       Income payments to foreign nationals (in percent of GDP)*  (22%) 
  ii) Restrictions  (50%) 
       Hidden Import Barriers  (20%) 
       Mean Tariff Rate  (30%) 
       Taxes on International Trade (in percent of current revenue)  (24%) 
       Capital Account Restrictions  (26%) 
B.  Data on Political Engagement  [28%] 
       Embassies in Country*  (34%) 
       Membership in International Organizations*  (34%) 
       Participation in UN Security Council Missions*  (32%) 
C.  Data on Social Globalization  [38%] 
  i) Data on Personal Contact  (24%) 
       Outgoing telephone traffic*  (31%) 
       Transfers (in percent of GDP)*  (9%) 
       International Tourism*  (1%) 
       Telephone Average Costs of Call to USA  (33%) 
       Foreign Population (in percent of total population)  (26%) 
  ii) Data on Information Flows  (39%) 
       Telephone Mainlines (per 1000 people)  (18%) 
       Internet Hosts (per capita)*  (15%) 
       Internet Users (as a share of population)*  (18%) 
       Cable Television (per 1000 people)  (16%) 
       Daily Newspapers (per 1000 people)  (16%) 
       Radios (per 1000 people)  (17%) 
  iii) Data on Cultural Proximity  (37%) 
       Number of McDonald’s Restaurants (per capita)  (100%) 
Notes:  The number in parenthesis indicates the weight used to derive the indexes. Weights may not 
sum  to  100  because  of  rounding.  All  indexes  range  between  0  (not  globalized)  and  10 
(globalized). 
*: These variables have been used in the AT.Kearney/Foreign Policy Index as well.   20
 
Table 2: Ratings of Globalization 







  Country Name  2000 2000 2000 1975  1990 2000
1.  United States  4.92 6.90 7.88 4.56  3.76 6.48
2.  Canada  5.17 6.56 7.61 5.49  4.78 6.37
3.  Sweden  5.62 5.63 7.85 5.18  5.11 6.24
4.  Denmark  5.63 4.76 7.26 5.28  4.45 5.75
5.  Finland  5.67 5.00 6.79 4.32  4.51 5.73
6.  Luxembourg  8.84 5.37 2.21 5.45  5.42 5.71
7.  United Kingdom  6.01 4.21 7.04 5.04  4.24 5.62
8.  Switzerland  5.96 5.16 5.63 4.86  5.04 5.57
9.  France  5.19 3.47 8.58 4.24  3.73 5.48
10.  Belgium  6.18 3.44 7.33 6.30  4.95 5.47
11.  Norway  5.31 4.68 6.62 4.37  4.39 5.43
12.  Netherlands  6.46 4.21 5.52 5.31  4.29 5.36
13.  Germany  5.38 3.94 6.99 4.26  3.74 5.28
14.  Austria  5.39 4.00 6.75 4.44  4.41 5.25
15.  Ireland  6.75 3.74 4.92 3.59  4.19 5.12
16.  Australia  4.60 6.05 4.37 3.58  3.98 5.08
17.  Singapore  6.90 5.35 2.11 3.56  3.95 5.00
18.  New Zealand  5.30 5.79 3.35 3.31  3.46 4.95
19.  United Arab Emirates  8.15 3.36 2.54 3.41  2.70 4.81
20.  Hong Kong  7.31 5.92 0.00 4.20  4.10 4.78
21.  Japan  4.16 4.93 4.84 3.92  3.29 4.64
22.  Italy  5.11 2.22 7.05 4.14  3.65 4.56
23.  Portugal  5.61 2.51 4.88 2.23  2.52 4.25
24.  Spain  5.01 2.22 5.31 2.85  2.91 4.05
25.  Iceland  4.87 4.53 2.05 3.49  3.12 3.97
26.  Argentina  4.17 1.98 5.96 2.35  2.61 3.84
27.  Czech Republic  4.86 2.32 4.48 n.a.  n.a. 3.80
28.  Poland  3.65 2.08 6.30 2.77  2.72 3.79
29.  Israel  4.73 3.77 2.51 3.10  2.40 3.76
30.  Russian Federation/ USSR  3.29 1.41 7.50 1.07  0.92 3.74
31.  Greece  4.76 2.36 4.30 3.01  2.60 3.73
32.  Uruguay  4.43 2.66 3.99 3.55  2.59 3.65
33.  Kuwait  4.31 3.60 2.72 2.72  2.77 3.61
34.  Malta  4.68 4.19 1.34 2.93  2.18 3.57
35.  Malaysia  4.69 2.02 4.16 2.50  2.41 3.54
36.  Hungary  4.26 2.41 4.16 2.77  2.41 3.54
37.  Egypt  3.41 1.32 6.67 1.59  1.71 3.52
38.  Bahrain  5.50 2.79 1.77 2.62  2.83 3.46
39.  Estonia  5.81 2.68 1.44 n.a.  n.a. 3.43
40.  Korea, Republic  3.86 2.72 3.65 2.71  2.85 3.37
41.  Chile  4.45 1.84 3.66 2.44  2.54 3.25
42.  Turkey  4.04 1.65 4.22 1.85  1.72 3.19
43.  Venezuela  4.10 1.73 3.99 2.86  2.24 3.18
44.  Brazil  3.50 1.54 4.95 1.51  1.56 3.17
45.  Cyprus  3.32 3.79 2.04 2.03  2.28 3.15
46.  Jordan  3.93 1.00 5.07 1.59  1.66 3.15
47.  Panama  4.90 2.09 2.31 3.81  2.74 3.13
48.  Slovak Republic  4.48 2.04 2.80 n.a.  n.a. 3.10
49.  Costa Rica  4.74 2.06 2.39 2.34  2.13 3.09
50.  Indonesia  3.85 0.96 4.98 1.69  1.73 3.08
51.  Slovenia  4.31 2.84 1.79 n.a.  n.a. 3.07  21
 
Table 2 (continued) 







  Country Name  2000 2000 2000 1975  1990  2000
52.  China  3.23 1.17 5.36 0.90  1.60  3.04
53.  Romania  3.73 1.62 4.08 3.34  1.84  3.04
54.  South Africa  4.21 1.56 3.55 1.96  1.68  3.03
55.  Latvia  4.94 2.25 1.54 n.a.  n.a.  2.99
56.  Mexico  4.03 1.47 3.44 2.19  2.13  2.91
57.  Trinidad and Tobago  4.57 1.94 1.92 1.92  1.75  2.86
58.  Bulgaria  4.04 1.25 3.43 2.72  2.45  2.83
59.  Kenya  3.33 0.81 4.81 1.70  1.38  2.80
60.  Jamaica  4.21 2.11 1.88 2.10  1.89  2.78
61.  Zambia  4.62 1.19 2.63 2.15  1.73  2.78
62.  India  2.26 1.01 5.86 1.85  1.55  2.78
63.  Lithuania  4.66 1.79 1.74 n.a.  n.a.  2.78
64.  Bolivia  4.32 1.10 2.88 2.04  1.89  2.72
65.  Peru  4.22 1.11 2.87 2.00  1.62  2.68
66.  Nicaragua  4.66 1.18 2.17 2.21  1.61  2.67
67.  Thailand  3.40 1.21 3.61 1.62  1.41  2.64
68.  El Salvador  4.39 1.57 1.84 1.84  1.57  2.63
69.  Tunisia  2.48 1.09 4.91 1.97  1.86  2.63
70.  Colombia  3.61 1.39 3.03 1.71  1.54  2.62
71.  Senegal  3.00 1.02 4.23 1.57  1.15  2.60
72.  Bangladesh  2.56 1.03 4.76 1.08  1.31  2.59
73.  Ghana  2.78 1.40 3.94 1.57  1.97  2.58
74.  Fiji  3.93 1.73 1.95 1.89  2.38  2.56
75.  Ukraine  3.77 0.74 3.46 n.a.  n.a.  2.55
76.  Nigeria  2.72 0.16 5.51 1.84  1.87  2.53
77.  Algeria  2.81 1.21 3.93 1.81  1.48  2.52
78.  Guatemala  3.89 1.45 2.06 1.85  1.53  2.47
79.  Philippines  3.60 1.16 2.82 1.41  1.45  2.47
80.  Ecuador  3.65 1.19 2.60 1.81  1.64  2.44
81.  Pakistan  1.58 1.12 5.30 1.54  0.99  2.43
82.  Morocco  2.48 1.14 4.09 1.92  1.82  2.42
83.  Mauritius  3.89 1.70 1.46 1.77  1.41  2.40
84.  Oman  4.29 0.78 2.15 2.58  2.05  2.38
85.  Uganda  4.14 0.89 1.91 1.24  0.79  2.31
86.  Honduras  3.85 1.20 1.84 1.65  1.39  2.30
87.  Croatia  2.89 1.99 1.86 n.a.  n.a.  2.27
88.  Botswana  4.36 1.13 1.10 2.68  2.29  2.25
89.  Zimbabwe  3.14 1.14 2.52 0.70  1.56  2.22
90.  Dominican Republic  3.04 1.51 1.95 1.58  1.38  2.17
91.  Sri Lanka  3.10 1.10 2.16 1.08  1.31  2.09
92.  Iran  2.42 1.01 3.11 2.44  1.33  2.08
93.  Cameroon  2.50 0.99 3.00 1.47  1.41  2.07
94.  Cote d'Ivoire  2.37 0.95 3.08 1.06  1.32  2.03
95.  Namibia  2.99 1.22 1.77 0.21  1.56  1.99
96.  Tanzania  2.09 0.97 3.18 1.99  1.18  1.97
97.  Syrian Arab Republic 3.01 0.26 2.96 1.82  1.65  1.96
98.  Albania  3.00 1.17 1.71 0.85  0.27  1.96
99.  Paraguay  3.45 0.63 1.83 1.76  1.72  1.94
100.  Guyana  3.53 0.72 1.51 1.87  1.90  1.92
101.  Bahamas  1.13 3.31 0.83 0.95  1.54  1.87
102.  Saudi Arabia  0.86 1.72 3.27 2.08  1.39  1.84  22
 
Table 2 (continued) 







  Country Name  2000 2000 2000 1975  1990 2000
103.  Barbados  2.24 1.84 1.17 2.39  2.21 1.80
104.  Gabon  2.62 0.31 2.70 1.80  1.65 1.77
105.  Congo, Republic  3.27 0.09 1.98 1.12  1.32 1.72
106.  Mali  2.00 0.51 2.96 1.26  1.46 1.70
107.  Congo, Dem. Republic  2.24 0.21 3.04 1.13  1.61 1.70
108.  Nepal  2.61 0.03 2.78 0.98  1.30 1.69
109.  Malawi  2.61 0.88 1.48 1.76  1.73 1.65
110.  Chad  2.28 0.69 1.78 1.04  1.42 1.55
111.  Belize  1.53 1.80 1.18 0.81  1.47 1.54
112.  Niger  1.86 0.70 2.13 1.18  0.84 1.50
113.  Papua New Guinea  2.78 0.20 1.18 1.29  1.77 1.37
114.  Togo  0.98 0.87 2.49 1.47  1.30 1.35
115.  Central African Republic  2.02 0.37 1.75 1.38  1.04 1.33
116.  Madagascar  1.56 0.76 1.64 1.21  0.98 1.28
117.  Burundi  2.00 0.58 1.25 0.93  0.99 1.26
118.  Benin  0.59 0.81 2.54 0.61  0.92 1.21
119.  Sierra Leone  2.10 0.13 1.54 1.41  1.12 1.21
120.  Myanmar  2.22 0.03 1.03 0.90  0.82 1.07
121.  Guinea-Bissau  0.99 0.26 2.00 0.73  1.43 0.99
122.  Haiti  0.34 1.07 1.53 0.72  1.02 0.94
123.  Rwanda  1.33 0.33 1.20 0.81  1.01 0.92
 
Notes: All indexes range from 0 (not globalized) to 10 (globalized). The countries are ranked 
according to their overall index score in 2000. 
 
Table 3: Per Capita GDP Growth and Globalization (1970-2000, 123 countries) 
  1970-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90  1991-95  1996-2000
Countries With Low 
Globalization 
2.62 2.08 0.35 0.68  0.14  1.16
     
Number of countries  68 71 80 83  64  40
     
Countries With High 
Globalization 
2.99 3.02 0.79 2.64  1.24  2.04
     
Number of countries  38 38 36 36  59  82
H0: mean(low) - 
mean(high) = 0 (P > |t|) 
0.58 0.17 0.51 0.001  0.11  0.05
 
Notes:  Indicates  GDP  per  capita  growth  rates  in  percent  in  countries  with  an  overall 
globalization index smaller and greater than the index-mean of 2.45, respectively.   23
 
Table 4: Per Capita GDP Growth and Globalization (1970-2000) 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
Overall Index of Globalization    1.09  0.84  0.95  0.07   
    (3.49
o)  (2.29*)  (2.96
o)  (2.29*)   
Index of Economic Integration            0.04 
            (2.53*) 
Index of Social Integration            0.02 
            (1.06) 
Index of Political Integration            0.01 
            (0.64) 
Log (per capita GDP),  -5.74  -5.93  -7.34  -5.88  1.30  1.22 







Secondary School Enrollment  0.03  0.03  0.004  0.03  -0.003  -0.002 
  (3.11
o)  (2.53*)  (0.40)  (2.33*)  (-1.32)  (-0.99) 
Log (Life Expectancy)  1.86  0.60  3.27  -0.04  -0.37  -0.33 
  (0.84)  (0.26)  (0.88)  (-0.02)  (-1.54)  (-1.44) 
Log (Fertility Rate)  -1.38  -1.49  -1.04  -1.25  -0.28  -0.28 
  (-1.38)  (-1.48)  (-0.86)  (-1.20)  (-2.36*)  (-2.55
o) 








Government Consumption (in percent of  -0.093  -0.10  -0.12  -0.12  -0.01  -0.01 
     GDP)  (-1.98*)  (-2.20*)  (-2.03*)  (-2.64
o)  (-1.11)  (-1.06) 
Rule-of-Law Index  0.19  0.17  0.06  0.13  0.02  0.02 
  (2.01*)  (1.83**)  (0.52)  (1.32)  (2.24*)  (2.10*) 





o)  (-2.46*)  (-2.68
o) 
Growth Rate of Terms of Trade  4.41  3.55  4.71  3.45  0.18  0.18 
  (1.93**)  (1.58)  (1.32)  (1.55)  (1.17)  (1.23) 
Liquid Liabilities      -0.22       
      (-0.23)       
Stock Market Capitalization      0.30       
      (0.67)       
Political Rights        -0.12     
        (0.45)     
Civil Liberties        0.17     
        (0.57)     
Democracy        -0.04     
        (-0.45)     
Estimation Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  GMM  GMM 
Number of countries  106  106  76  105  102  102 
Number of observations  435  434  260  426  325  325 
R² (within)  0.42  0.44  0.45  0.43     
Sargan Test (p-level)          0.45  0.26 
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)          0.82  0.73 
Notes:  
In the OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the average GDP per capita growth rate. When estimated with 
GMM, the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at the end of each five-year period is employed. 
A dummy for each time period is included, the OLS regressions also include a dummy for each country. 
Robust (White) t-statistics are shown in parentheses: 
o: significant at the 1 percent level, *: significant at the 5 percent level, **: significant at the 10 percent level.   24
 
 
Table 5: Per Capita GDP Growth and Economic Integration (1970-2000) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7a  7b 
Index of Economic Integration  0.42        0.04       
  (2.40*)        (2.37*)       
Index of Actual Economic Flows    0.96        0.07     
    (3.92
o)        (2.53*)     
Index of Restrictions      0.004           
      (0.03)           
Restrictions * Log (per capita GDP),        -0.03      -0.001  0.001 
     (low income countries)        (-1.20)      (-0.35)  (0.21) 
Restrictions * Log (per capita GDP),        0.01      0.001  0.001 
     (middle income countries)        (0.41)      (0.62)  (0.64) 
Restrictions * Log (per capita GDP),        0.09      0.004  0.01 
     (high income countries)        (3.91
o)      (1.72**) (3.56
o) 
Log (per capita GDP),  -5.75  -5.62  -5.81  -6.32  1.34  1.38  0.86  0.69 













o)  (2.27*)  (-1.11)  (-1.26)  (-0.44)  (0.42) 
Log (Life Expectancy)  0.94  0.77  1.97  2.09  -0.34  -0.38  -0.16  -0.11 
  (0.43)  (0.28)  (0.88)  (2.27*)  (-1.35)  (-1.51)  (-1.15)  (-0.88) 
Log (Fertility Rate)  -1.26  -1.88  -1.08  -2.19  -0.29  -0.34  -0.18  -0.22 
  (-1.27)  (-1.93**) (-1.08)  (-2.09*) (-2.33*)  (-2.59
o)  (-2.25*) (-2.59
o) 









Government Consumption (in percent   -0.11  -0.10  -0.10  -0.11  -0.01  -0.01  -0.001  -0.01 
    of GDP)  (-2.24*) (-2.18*) (-2.08*) (-2.44*) (-1.08)  (-1.02)  (-1.21)  (-1.54) 
Rule-of-Law Index  0.20  0.20  0.24  0.18  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01 
  (2.02*)  (2.14*)  (2.35*)  (1.82**) (2.34*)  (2.27*)  (2.30*)  (2.54*) 





o)  (-2.42*)  (-2.32*)  (-3.62
o)  (-3.99
o) 
Growth Rate of Terms of Trade  4.23  2.69  4.41  3.54  0.21  0.12  0.14  0.08 
  (1.83**) (1.19)  (1.88**) (1.58)  (1.33)  (0.71)  (1.07)  (0.63) 
                 
Estimation Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM 
Number of countries  106  106  105  105  102  102  100  100 
Number of observations  435  435  463  423  326  326  314  314 
R² (within)  0.43  0.46  0.37  0.46         
Sargan Test (p-level)          0.29  0.35  0.03  0.28 
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)          0.85  0.96  0.22  0.16 
Notes:  
In the OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the average GDP per capita growth rate. When estimated with 
GMM, the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at the end of each five-year period is employed. 
A dummy for each time period is included, the OLS regressions also include a dummy for each country. Column 
7b  treats  the  interaction  terms  as  predetermined,  while  all  variables  are  treated  as  exogenous  in  the  other 
columns. 
Robust (White) t-statistics are shown in parentheses: 
o: significant at the 1 percent level 
*: significant at the 5 percent level 
**: significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 6: Per Capita GDP Growth and Political Integration (1970-2000)  
1  2 
Index of Political Integration  0.003  0.01 
  (0.02)  (0.65) 
Log (per capita GDP), beginning of period  -5.75  1.40 
       (-6.85
o)  (3.88
o) 
Secondary School Enrollment  0.03  -0.004 
  (3.10
o)  (-1.40) 
Log (Life Expectancy)  1.86  -0.38 
  (0.84)  (-1.40) 
Log (Fertility Rate)  -1.37  -0.28 
  (-1.39)  (-2.23*) 




Government Consumption (in percent of  -0.09  -0.01 
     GDP)  (-1.98*)  (-1.09) 
Rule-of-Law Index  0.19  0.02 
  (2.00)  (2.40*) 
Inflation Rate  -0.001  -0.0001 
  (-3.83
o)  (-2.23*) 
Growth Rate of Terms of Trade  4.41  0.23 
  (1.92**)  (1.37) 
Estimation Method  OLS  GMM 
Number of countries  106  102 
Number of observations  435  326 
R² (within)  0.42   
Sargan Test (p-level)    0.33 
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)    0.87 
Notes:  
In the OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the average GDP per capita growth rate. When estimated with 
GMM, the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at the end of each five-year period is employed. 
A dummy for each time period is included, the OLS regressions also include a dummy for each country. 
Robust (White) t-statistics are shown in parentheses: 
o: significant at the 1 percent level 
*: significant at the 5 percent level 
**: significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 7: Per Capita GDP Growth and Social Integration (1970-2000)  
1  2  3  4  5  6a  6b 
Index of Social Integration  0.83      0.03       
  (3.69
o)      (1.19)       
Index of Personal Contact    0.29      0.01     
    (1.86**)     (0.64)     
Index of Information Flows      1.25      0.03  0.12 
      (3.70
o)      (0.75)  (3.15
o) 
Log (per capita GDP), beginning of period  -6.13  -6.45  -6.31  1.23  1.15  1.16  0.75 








Secondary School Enrollment  0.02  0.02  0.02  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001 
  (2.08*)  (1.74**) (2.11*) (-1.20)  (-0.93)  (-1.07)  (-0.90) 
Log (Life Expectancy)  1.35  2.23  1.22  -0.27  -0.18  -0.31  -0.28 
  (0.60)  (1.03)  (0.55)  (-1.66**) (-0.79)  (-1.45)  (-2.16*)
Log (Fertility Rate)  -2.49  -0.88  -3.24  -0.28  -0.23  -0.27  -0.30 
  (-2.27*) (-0.89)  (-2.74
o)  (-2.55*) (-1.86**)  (-2.60
o)  (-3.50
o) 









Government Consumption (in percent of  -0.09  -0.83  -0.10  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
     GDP)  (-1.93**) (-1.70**) (-2.17*) (-1.06)  (-0.82)  (-1.11)  (-1.31) 
Rule-of-Law Index  0.16  0.17  0.15  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01 
  (1.65**) (1.71**) (1.50)  (2.18*)  (2.37*)  (2.15*)  (1.73**)
Inflation Rate  -0.001  -0.01  -0.001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
  (-4.10
o)  (-2.43*) (-3.81
o)  (-2.53*) (-2.18*)  (-2.71
o)  (-3.85
o) 
Growth Rate of Terms of Trade  3.60  2.16  3.99  0.24  0.12  0.21  0.13 
  (1.64)  (0.94)  (1.78**) (1.36)  (0.74)  (1.44)  (1.09) 
Estimation Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM   
Number of countries  106  105  106  102  99  102  102 
Number of observations  434  403  435  325  294  326  326 
R² (within)  0.44  0.45  0.44         
Sargan Test (p-level)        0.23  0.17  0.07  0.12 
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)        0.67  0.57  0.53  0.13 
Notes:  
In the OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the average GDP per capita growth rate. When estimated with 
GMM, the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at the end of each five-year period is employed. 
A dummy for each time period is included, the OLS regressions also include a dummy for each country. Column 
6b treats information flows as predetermined, while all variables are treated as exogenous in the other columns. 
Robust (White) t-statistics are shown in parentheses: 
o: significant at the 1 percent level 
*: significant at the 5 percent level 
**: significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 8: Robustness Analysis 
  Overall Index  Actual Economic 
Flows 
Restrictions * 






  OLS  GMM  OLS  GMM  OLS  GMM  OLS  GMM 
Least Absolute 
Value Regression 
10    5    1        insig.   
Without East 
Asian Countries 




5  insig.  1  5  1  1  1  10 
Without Sub 
Saharan Africa 
10  1  1  5  5  5  1  5 
Without OECD 
Countries 
5  1  1  10  -  -  insig.  insig. 
Without China  1  5  1  5  1  1  1  10 
and India                 
Black Market 
Premium 
1  10  1  1  1  1  1  insig. 
Overall Budget 
Balance 
5  insig.  1  5  1  5  1  insig. 
Political 
Instability 
5  insig.  1  5  1  5  1  insig. 
Theil Index  5  10  1  10  1  1  1  insig. 
Banking Quality  5








1  10  1  10  1  5  1  5 
Notes: 
In the OLS regressions, the dependent variable is the average GDP per capita growth rate. 
When estimated with GMM, the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at the end of each five-
year period is employed. 
Numbers indicate the significance level of the respective index. All regressions include the 
covariates of Table 4, column 1. 
 
1 No category has been omitted, even if no data for the index has been available in a certain 
period. Instead, data from the next period available have been used. 
2 This corresponds to the results of Table 4.   28
 
Appendix A: Definitions 
 
Trade (in percent of GDP): Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross 
domestic product. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (in percent of GDP): Sum of the absolute values of inflows and outflows of foreign 
direct investment recorded in the balance of payments. 
 
Portfolio Investment (in percent of GDP): Sum of absolute values of portfolio investment assets and portfolio 
investment liabilities. 
 
Income (in percent of GDP): Income payments refer to employee compensation paid to nonresident workers and 
investment income. 
 
Hidden Import Barriers: barriers other than published tariffs and quotas. 
 
Mean Tariff Rate: The formula used to calculate the 0-to-10 rating for each country was: (Vmax -Vi ) / (Vmax -Vmin ) 
multiplied by 10. vi  represents the country‘s mean tariff rate. The values for Vmin and Vmax were set at 0% and 
50%, respectively. This formula will allocate a rating of 10 to countries that do not impose tariffs. As the mean 
tariff rate increases, countries are assigned lower ratings. The rating will decline toward zero as the mean tariff 
rate approaches 50%.  
 
Taxes on International Trade (in percent of current revenue): Include import duties, export duties, profits of 
export or import monopolies, exchange profits, and exchange taxes. 
 
Capital Account Restrictions: The index is based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions and includes 13 different types of capital controls. It is constructed by subtracting the 
number of restriction from 13 and multiplying the result by 10. 
 
Embassies in Country: Absolute number. 
 
Membership in International Organizations: Absolute number. 
 
Participation in UN Security Council Missions: Absolute number of missions a country participated. 
 
Outgoing telephone traffic: Measured in minutes per 1000 population. 
 
Transfers (in percent of GDP): Measures inflows and outflows of goods, services, income, or financial items 
without a quid pro quo. 
 
International Tourism (as a share of population): Sum of arrivals and departures. 
 
Telephone Average Costs of Call to USA: Cost of a three-minute peak rate call from the country to the United 
States. 
 
Foreign Population (in percent of total population): Foreign (or foreign-born) population is the number of foreign 
or foreign-born residents in a country. 
 
Telephone  Mainlines  (per  1000  people):  Telephone  mainlines  are  telephone  lines  connecting  a  customer's 
equipment to the public switched telephone network.  
 
Internet Hosts (per capita). 
 
Internet Users (as a share of population): Internet users are people with access to the worldwide network. 
 
Cable Television (per 1000 people): Cable television subscribers are households that subscribe to a multichannel 
television service delivered by a fixed line connection. 
 
Daily Newspapers (per 1000 people): Daily newspapers refer to those published at least four times a week. 
 
Radios (per 1000 people): Radios refer to radio receivers in use for broadcasts to the general public.   29
 
 
Number of McDonald’s Restaurants (per capita). 
 
GDP per capita growth: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency.  
 
Log (per capita GDP): GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data are for the 
end of each five-year period. 
 
Secondary School Enrollment: Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Secondary education 
completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level. 
 
Log (Life Expectancy): Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if 
prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. 
 
Log (Fertility Rate): Represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the 
end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. 
 
Investment (in percent of GDP): Gross domestic investment. 
 
Government Consumption (in percent of GDP): All government current expenditures for purchases of goods and 
services (including compensation of employees). 
 
Rule-of-Law Index: Measures the quality of the legal system and property rights. 
 
Inflation Rate: Measured by the consumer price index. The Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
 
Growth Rate of Terms of Trade: Base year is 1995. 
 
Liquid Liabilities: Liquid Liabilities to GDP equals currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of 
banks and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP. 
 
Stock Market Capitalization: Equals the value of listed shares divided by GDP. 
 
Political Rights: rates political rights with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. 
 
Civil Liberties: rates civil liberties with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. 
 
Democracy: 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high) democracy score. Measures the general openness of political institutions. 
  
Black Market Premium: (Parallel Exchange Rate/Official Exchange Rate-1) *100. 
 
Overall Budget Balance (in percent of GDP): Includes grants. 
 
Political  Instability:  Index  constructed  with  principal  components  analysis.  The  weights  obtained  for  the 
components are 0.08 (assassination), 0.1 (strikes), 0.25 (guerrilla warfare), 0.15 (crisis), 0.16 (riots) and 0.27 
(revolutions). 
 
Theil Index: The Theil inequality index is a weighted geometric average of income relatives. 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources 
 
Variable  Data Source    Mean  Std. Dev. 
Trade Index   World Bank (2002a)  overall  1.91  1.44
    between    1.36
    within    0.48
Foreign Direct  World Bank (2002a)  overall  1.24  1.54
Investment Index    between    1.31
    within    0.93
Portfolio Investment   IMF  (2002)  overall  1.48  1.82
Index    between    1.32
    within    1.17
Income Index  World Bank (2002a)  overall  0.88  1.43
    between    1.22
    within    0.98
Hidden Import   Gwartney and   overall  6.47  1.82
Barriers Index  Lawson (2002)  between    1.82
    within    0.44
Mean Tariff Rate Index  Gwartney and   overall  6.32  2.66
  Lawson (2002)  between    2.15
    within    1.49
Taxes on International  World Bank (2002a)  overall  7.42  2.39
Trade Index    between    2.29
    within    0.91
Capital Account   Gwartney and   overall  3.10  3.32
Restrictions Index  Lawson (2002)  between    2.70
    within    1.92
Embassies in Country  Europa World   overall  3.51  2.47
Index  Yearbook   between    2.18
  (various years)  within    1.18
Membership in   Union of International  overall  4.41  1.92
International   Associations  between    1.63
Organizations Index  (various years)  within    1.01
Participation in UN   Department of   overall  1.49  2.33
Security Council   Peacekeeping   between    2.07
Missions Index  Operations, UN  within    1.09
Outgoing Telephone   World Bank (2002a)  overall  0.68  1.38
Traffic Index    between    1.22
    within    0.40
Transfers Index  World Bank (2002a)  overall  1.95  2.09
    between    1.89
    within    1.11
International Tourism  World Bank (2002a)  overall  1.62  2.11
Index    between    1.95
    within    0.58
Telephone Average   World Bank (2002a)  overall  7.92  1.84
Costs of Call to USA    between    1.84
Index    within    0.00
Internet Hosts Index  International   overall  0.96  1.77
  Telecommunications   between    1.75
  Union  within    0.31  31
 
 
Variable  Data Source    Mean  Std. Dev. 
Internet Users Index  World Bank (2002a)  overall  0.32  1.14
    between    0.60
    within    0.98
Cable Television   World Bank (2002a)  overall  1.37  2.40
Index    between    1.93
    within    0.84
Daily Newspapers   World Bank (2002a)  overall  1.68  2.06
Index    between    1.98
    within    0.41
Radios Index  World Bank (2002a)  overall  1.72  1.58
    between    1.50
    within    0.50
McDonald’s Index  McDonald’s  overall  1.09  1.89
  Corporation  between    1.85
    within    0.41
GDP per capita  World Bank (2002a)  overall  1.52  3.30
growth rate    between    1.96
    within    2.67
Log (per capita GDP)  World Bank (2002a)  overall  7.79  1.58
    between    1.56
    within    0.21
Secondary School  World Bank (2002a)  overall  56.55  32.93
Enrollment    between    31.09
    within    11.20
Log (Life  World Bank (2002a)  overall  4.14  0.19
Expectancy)    between    0.18
    within    0.05
Log (Fertility Rate)  World Bank (2002a)  overall  1.22  0.55
    between    0.52
    within    0.18
Investment (in   Global Development   overall  22.48  7.21
percent of GDP)  Network Growth   between    5.69
  Database  within    4.38
Government   World Bank (2002a)  overall  15.46  5.92
consumption (in     between    5.26
percent of GDP)    within    2.81
Rule-of-Law Index  Gwartney and   overall  5.47  1.96
  Lawson (2002)  between    1.60
    within    1.06
Inflation Rate  World Bank (2002a)  overall  54.86  368.39
    between    180.43
    within    325.48
Growth Rate of   World Bank (2002a)  overall  0.0034  0.0589
Terms of Trade    between    0.0277
    within    0.0539
Liquid Liabilities  Beck et al. (1999)  overall  0.46  0.31
    between    0.31
    within    0.13
Stock Market  Beck et al. (1999)  overall  0.33  0.45
Capitalization    between    0.36
    within    0.24  32
 
 
Variable  Data Source    Mean  Std. Dev. 
Political Rights  Gastil (2000)  overall  3.75  2.18
    between    1.90
    within    1.06
Civil Liberties  Gastil (2000)  overall  3.80  1.88
    between    1.69
    within    0.83
Democracy  Marshall and Jaggers  overall  4.68  4.23
  (2000)  between    3.77
    within    1.93
Black Market   Global Development   overall  143.68  2109.66
Premium  Network Growth   between    4615.41
  Database  within    411.32
Overall Budget   World Bank (2002a)  overall  -3.33  5.25
Balance    between    4.11
    within    3.55
Political Instability  Global Development   overall  0.23  0.37
  Network Growth   between    0.27
  Database  within    0.25
Theil Index  University of Texas   overall  0.05  0.05
  Inequality Project  between    0.05
    within    0.03
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